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Sounds and Space 
Matthew Nudds 
 
Where are sounds and where do we experience them to be?  In what follows I argue 
that when we hear them sounds are where we are, but that we don’t hear them to be 
where we are because we don’t hear them to be anywhere.  This conclusion follows 
from the account I give (in section 1) of what sounds are and (in section 2) of the role 
of space in auditory perception. 
1. What are sounds? 
 
The function of auditory perception  
 
We have perceptual systems because they are useful, and they are useful because they 
tell us things about our environment and about what is happening in our 
environment.  Auditory perception is no exception: it tells us about objects and events 
in our environment by detecting disturbances in the air caused by those objects and 
events.   
In what follows I am going to talk about the perception of what may be 
labelled ‘ecological’ sounds and their sources – those sounds produced by naturally 
occurring events or various kinds.  I am going to ignore the role of sounds in 
communication and in the perception of music.  Although both depend on the more 
fundamental processes involved in ecological sound perception that I am going to 
describe (and to the extent that they don’t depend on those more fundamental 
processes they are distinct perceptual systems) they raise specific problems that I will 
not go into here. 
Auditory perception tells us about objects and events in our environment and 
the sounds produced by those objects and events.  When we hear a sound we can 
attend to the source of the sound and its properties – what it is, how it is, where it is, 
whether it is moving, and so on – or we can attend to the sound itself and its 
properties – its pitch, timbre, loudness, and so on.  Although relatively little 
investigation has been done to determine how good we are at perceiving and 
recognising sound sources, that which has been done has found that we are 




For example, we can perceive the size of an object dropped into water; that 
something is rolling; we can tell the material composition of an object from the sound 
of an impact; we can tell the force of an impact; we can distinguish objects with 
different shapes; we can tell the length of a rod dropped onto the floor; when 
something is dropped we can hear whether it bounced or broke; we are good at 
recognising natural sounds such as footsteps, hands clapping, paper tearing, and so on; 
we can tell that a cup is being filled and when it is full.  These are all examples that 
have been empirically demonstrated; it would be possible to find many more.1 
Ecological sounds themselves, rather than their sources, are not very 
interesting; for many ecological sounds it is actually rather difficult to attend to the 
sound rather than to the source of the sound and we are poor at describing the 
properties of the sound as opposed to the source of the sound (we tend to describe the 
sounds in terms of their sources – ‘it’s like the sound made by…).2  It is easy to 
overlook this about our perception of ecological sounds because we have become so 
used to hearing artificially produced sounds for which it isn’t true (or for which the 
opposite is true). 
We can perceive these various things about the sources of sounds because 
auditory perception functions to tell us about the sources of the sounds we hear, and 
our auditory experience is of, or represents, the sources of sounds and their properties 
as well as sounds and their properties.  It does so, I shall argue, by representing sounds 
as having been produced by their sources. 
 
The sources of sounds 
 
To understand how auditory perception carries out its function of telling us about the 
sources of sounds we need to start with how the things that produce sounds – the 
sources of sounds – do so.  Sounds can be produced by different kinds of things – 
liquids, material objects, strings, air movement – and in different ways; for simplicity I 
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am going to consider only material objects: material objects produce sounds when 
they are struck, tapped, scraped, broken, or otherwise caused to vibrate. 
We generally picture vibrations as single sine waves, but not even something as 
simple as a plucked string vibrates in a simple way.  The vibration of a plucked string 
is complex and comprises a number of simple vibrations at different frequencies which 
are integer multiples of the lowest, or fundamental, frequency of the vibration.3  
Objects vibrate along a greater number of dimensions than strings and consequently 
their vibrations have a greater number of frequency components.  Any complex 
vibration is equivalent to a number of simple sine wave frequency components 
superimposed on each other with appropriate phase relationships.  That means we 
can represent any complex vibration as a pattern or structure of individual phase-
related frequency components. 
What’s important for our understanding of auditory perception is that the 
particular pattern of frequency components produced by a material object when it 
vibrates is determined in a law-like way by the physical nature of the object and the 
nature of the event that caused it to vibrate. 
For example, the shape and size of the object determine the lowest frequency 
of its vibration, and what harmonics are present.  The overall amplitude of the 
vibration is determined by the force that initially deforms the object.  Because objects 
are not linearly elastic, the amplitude of individual frequency components varies with 
the initial deformation.  The spectral composition of the vibration therefore changes 
according to how hard the object was struck (which is why we can distinguish in 
experience the intensity or loudness of a sound from the force of the impact that 
produced the sound; the first is a property of the sound, the second of the source of the 
sound).  Vibrating objects lose energy over time and their vibration decays.  The rate 
of decay of different frequency components is determined by the material of which the 
object is composed. 
Because the pattern of frequency components that comprise the vibration of 
an object and the way that pattern changes over time is determined by the nature of 
the object and the events that caused it to vibrate, that pattern and the way it changes 
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 The vibration of a plucked string is made up of the odd harmonics of the fundamental; unlike the 
vibration of a string excited in some other way which includes both odd and even harmonics. See 
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embody a great deal of information about the object and the interaction that 
produced the vibration.   
The vibrations of objects are transmitted through the air.  In an enclosed 
space, the vibrations will tend to reflect off hard surfaces and surrounding objects, and 
vibrations from different objects will interact with each other.  These reflections and 
interactions will change the spectral composition of a vibration in determinate ways.  
At any place, the local disturbance of the air at that place will carry information about 
any number of events and, in virtue having been structured by it, about the 
environment in which those events occur.  This local disturbance of the air is what is 
detected by our ears. 
 
From detection to perception 
 
Auditory perception tells us about the sources of sounds.  In order to do so it must 
extract the information about those sources embodied in the pattern of frequency 
components of the soundwave that is detected by the ears.  The frequency 
components detected by the ears are the result of the interaction of many different 
object vibrations.  How does the auditory system extract information about individual 
objects?4  We can divide the process into three stages. 
The first stage is that of sensory transduction or detection: the ears detect 
properties of the soundwave – the local disturbance of the air.  We can think of the 
                                                
4
 Albert Bregman illustrates the problem as follows.  Suppose that you are standing by a lake on which 
there are boats:  “Your friend digs two narrow channels up from the side of the lake.  Each is a few feet 
long and a few inches wide and they are spaced a few feet apart.  Halfway up each one, your friend 
stretches a handkerchief and fastens it to the side of the channel.  As waves reach the side of the lake 
they travel up the channels and cause the two handkerchiefs to go into motion.  You are allowed to look 
only at the handkerchiefs and from their motions to answer a series of questions: How many boats are 
there on the lake and where are they?  Which is the most powerful one?  Which is the closer?  Is the 
wind blowing?  Has any large object been dropped suddenly into the lake?  Solving this problem seems 
impossible, but it is a strict analogy to the problem faced by our auditory systems.  The lake represents 
the lake of air that surrounds us.  The two channels are our two ear canals, and the handkerchiefs are 
our ear drums.  The only information that the auditory system has available to it, or ever will have, is 
the vibrations of these two ear drums.  Yet it seems able to answer questions very like the ones that were 
asked by the side of the lake: How many people are talking? Which one is louder, or closer? Is there a 
machine humming in the background” (Bregman 1990, pp. 5-6). 
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result of the detection of the soundwave as a temporal spectrogram of the soundwave 
which encodes the frequency and temporal properties of the soundwave’s vibration.  
In effect, the ears detect each of the frequency components (within a detectable range) 
present in the soundwave’s vibration. 
Information about objects and events is embodied in the relationships amongst 
the frequency components produced by an object’s vibration; but the frequency 
components detected by the ears may have been produced by many different sources; 
so in order both to determine how many sound producing events are occurring at any 
time and to extract information about the objects involved in them – the auditory 
system must organise frequency components into groups corresponding to the objects 
and events that produced them.  The second stage of processing therefore involves 
grouping together frequency components that have been produced by the same 
source.  Frequency components need to be grouped so that all the frequency 
components produced by a single source are treated together, and those from different 
sources treated as distinct by subsequent processes. 
There are two kinds of grouping.  Frequency components produced at a time 
must be grouped together as having been produced simultaneously by a source; 
simultaneous groups must be sequentially grouped over time as having been produced 
by a single temporally extended event and series of such sequences grouped as having 
been produced by a series of events involving the same object.   
For example, when two objects make a sound simultaneously we normally 
hear two distinct sounds – we hear the sound made by each of them; when we hear 
water filling a glass we hear a single continuous sound – we experience earlier and 
later parts of the sound as parts of the same sound; when we hear an object dropped 
onto a hard surface and bounce we hear the sound of each individual bounce and we 
hear the series of bounces as the bounces of a single object.  We hear these sounds as a 
consequence of the way that frequency components are grouped.  This grouping is 
necessary in order for subsequent auditory processes to extract the information about 
sources embodied in the soundwave. 
How does the auditory system group frequency components, how does it 
determine which frequency components to group together and which to group 
separately?  There are relationships that exist between components produced by the 
same source that are unlikely to exist between components produced by different 
sources.  For example, an object’s vibration often has frequency components that are 
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harmonics of a fundamental frequency and so the frequency components of a 
soundwave that are produced by the same source will often be harmonically related.  
Such harmonic relationships are unlikely to exist between frequency components 
produced by distinct sources since it is unlikely that two simultaneously occurring 
natural events produce overlapping sets of harmonics.  This means that if the auditory 
system detects a number of frequency components that are harmonically related then 
they are likely to have been produced by the same source.  Similarly, the soundwave 
produced by a single event will have frequency components that share temporal 
properties – all the components will begin at the same time – are likely to be in phase 
with one another, and are likely to change over time in both amplitude and frequency 
in similar ways.  Components produced by distinct sources are very unlikely to be 
related to each other in these ways.  This means that if the auditory system detects a 
number of frequency components that share these temporal properties then they are 
likely to have been produced by the same source.  When the auditory system detects 
these relationships between components it groups them together and treats them as 
having been produced by the same source.  Components that are not related in this 
way are grouped separately.  Similar relationships exist between frequency 
components produced by the same source at different times. 
These examples are of properties that determine bottom-up or stimulus driven 
grouping.  It is likely that the auditory system also uses information in a top-down way 
to determine grouping, particularly of sequences.  Some sequences are grouped 
because they fit into a pattern that the auditory system recognises as likely to have 
been produced by a certain kind of source.  Hearing an object as bouncing, for 
example, may be the result of top-down grouping.5 
It is important to note that we cannot explain why the auditory system groups 
the frequency components that it detects in the way it does other than in terms of a 
process that functions to extract information about the objects that produced those 
frequency components.  This is true of both simultaneous and sequential grouping.  
The auditory system groups together all and only frequency components that are 
likely to have been produced by the same source because they are likely to have been 
produced by the same source. 
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 Bregman calls this ‘schema-based organisation’: it involves ‘the activation of stored knowledge of 
familiar patterns or schemas in the acoustic environment’ (Bregman, 1990, p. 397). 
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The third stage of processing is not well understood.  The process of grouping 
results in sets of frequency components that are treated by subsequent processes as 
having been produced by a single source.  These sets of components carry information 
about those sources, and the fact that we can perceive various properties of the sources 
of sounds means that the auditory system must extract that information.  Exactly what 
information is extracted and how it is extracted is, for the most part, unclear.  We can 
perceive how many sources there are and often where they are; I’ve described 
examples of various features of sources that we can perceive, and examples of our 
ability to recognise sources as events of certain kinds or involving certain kinds of 
object.  These recognition processes might match representations of the features of 
sources with representations of kinds of events and objects (similarly to the way visual 
object recognition functions), or they might simply track some characteristic pattern of 
frequency components produced by certain kinds of events and objects.  However 
exactly the information extraction and object recognition processes work, they must – 





It is in virtue of the operation of these psychological processes we have experiences 
sounds and their sources.  What sounds we experience and how we experience them 
to be is determined by the way the auditory system groups the frequency components 
it detects: the sounds we hear correspond to frequency component groupings.  If the 
auditory system groups the components it detects into a single group then we 
experience a single sound; if it groups them into two groups, then we experience two 
sounds.  Given that the auditory system groups frequency components that are likely 
to have been produced by the same source, the sounds we experience normally 
correspond to their sources – to the things that produced them. 
Given that what sounds we hear is determined by the way the auditory system 
groups frequency components, and that we can only explain why the auditory system 
groups frequency components in terms of a process that functions to tell us about the 
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sources of sounds, it follows that we can only explain why we experience the sounds 
we do in terms of a process that functions to tell us about the sources of sounds.6   
 
What are sounds? 
 
The auditory system functions to tell us about the sources of sounds.  We experience 
sounds as a consequence of the way the auditory system carries out this function: the 
sounds we experience are the result of the way the auditory system groups the 
frequency components that it detects in order to extract information about the sources 
that produced them. 
Given this, it is plausible that our experience of sounds represents patterns or 
structures of frequency components instantiated by the soundwaves that are detected 
by the ears.  It follows that an experience of a sound is veridical just in case it is 
produced by the pattern or structure of frequency components that would normally 
produce that experience.  It is not veridical if it is not produced by any such pattern or 
if it is produced by a pattern that would not normally produce that experience.7 
Our normal ways of individuating sounds allows that two people, in different – 
even very distant – places, can hear the same particular sound – you and I both hear 
the same sound when we hear the sound of a gunshot.  To deny this would be to allow 
that a single event – a gunshot, say – produces more than one sound: a sound heard 
by me, and a sound heard by you at a distance.  Since people at different places who 
hear the same sound are not – or need not be – affected by the same instantiation of 
frequency components we cannot identify particular sounds with instances of a pattern 
or structural type.  Similarly, our normal ways of individuating sounds allows that two 
people hear the same sound even if they hear it as having different qualities.  The 
sound of a gunshot heard close by may be different – louder, sharper – to that same 
sound heard at a distance; it is, nonetheless, the same sound.  But again, since the 
instantiation of frequency components must be different in the two cases, and may 
even be an instance of a different pattern, the sound we both hear cannot be identical 
to an instance of a pattern type.  
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not space here to defend my account in detail; for a more detailed discussion see my ‘Auditory 
Perception’. 
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If sounds are not identical to instances of pattern types, then could they be the 
pattern types themselves?  Our normal way of individuating them treats sounds as 
particular things such that we can allow that two sounds may be qualitatively the same 
– the same type of sound – and yet be distinct individual sounds.  Two sounds that are 
indistinguishable, for example, are usually counted as distinct if they are produced by 
different sources.  Thinking of sounds as pattern types doesn’t allow us to make this 
distinction.  Furthermore, if sounds are things that come into being when they are 
produced then for any sound there is a time before which it did not exist, a time at 
which it came into existence and, presumably, a time at which it will cease to exist; 
although instances of pattern types have these temporal properties, pattern types 
themselves do not.   
Any account of sounds should, as far as possible, accommodate our normal 
ways of individuating sounds.  The ontological category that comes closest to doing so 
is that of particularized types or abstract individuals: to view sounds as abstract 
individuals would be to view them as belonging to the same ontological category as 
symphonies and other multiply instantiated art works or words (on Kaplan’s account 
of the ontology of words).8  To claim that sounds are abstract individuals is not, of 
course, to deny that sounds are instantiated by soundwaves any more than to claim 
that words are abstract individuals is to deny that words are instantiated by, for 
example, patterns of ink on paper.  It simply allows the possibility that a sound, like a 
word, may be instantiated at more than one place and time. 
 
Where are sounds? 
 
Having given some account of what sounds are I am now in a position to address the 
question of where they are located.  I have suggested that sounds are patterns or 
structures of frequency components instantiated by a soundwave; if that’s right, then 
we can only make sense of talking of the location of a sound in terms of the location of 
its instantiation.  Soundwaves spread out from their sources and their identity and 
location at any time can be indeterminate; there may, therefore, be no very 
determinate answer to the question of where a sound is instantiated.  Although it may 
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not be possible to say exactly where a sound is instantiated, the sounds we hear are 
instantiated by soundwaves that affect us so, wherever else they may also be 
instantiated, when we hear them sounds are instantiated where we are. 
The sounds that we hear are instantiated where we are but they are usually not 
only instantiated where we are; they are usually instantiated throughout a region of 
space that includes where we are.  Of course that doesn’t mean that we only ever hear 
part of a sound that affects us: sounds are patterns or structures that are instantiated 
by soundwaves and the entire pattern or structure is wholly instantiated wherever it is 
instantiated, including where we are.  A sound can be instantiated in different regions 
of space at different times; therefore, just as the pattern of ripples on the surface of a 
pool of water can be said to move, sounds can be said to move.9 
Is this account of sounds inconsistent with our experience of sounds?  Several 
writers have suggested that it is.10  They claim that we hear the location of the sources 
of sounds and that we experience sounds as located at their sources – they claim that 
sounds seem to be at their sources.  If that’s right then any account of what sounds are 
must – on pain of being committed to a view according to which  auditory experience 
is generally non-veridical – identify sounds with something located at their sources – 
events involving their sources or the vibrations of the sources.  Whilst a perceptual 
system may always be susceptible to error, an account that has the consequence that 
the auditory system is always erroneous is implausible.  Since the view that I have 
outlined entails that sounds are not, or not only, located at their sources it is, 
according to this objection, committed to viewing auditory experience as generally 
non-veridical and, as such, it is an implausible view. 
A satisfactory response to this phenomenological objection must address two 
worries.  First, can the account that I have given explain how we are able to perceive 
the location of the sources of sounds?  Second, is my account inconsistent with the 
phenomenology of our auditory experience and committed to viewing auditory 
experience as generally non-veridical?  Before directly addressing those two worries I 
want to say something about the role of space in the auditory processes that I have 
described.  Understanding that role will help to answer these questions. 
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 Although sounds can be said to move, we don’t experience them as moving (and, indeed, what would 
be the point in hearing sounds move?). 
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 For example, Pasnau (1999); Casati and Dokic (1994, this volume); and O’Callaghan (2005). 
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2. Space in auditory perception  
 
What role does space play in auditory grouping?  Grouping is the process, remember, 
by which the frequency components detected by the ears are grouped so as to 
correspond to their sources.  The fact that a group of components all come from the 
same location is good evidence that they have been produced by the same source and 
the fact that two components come from different locations is good evidence that they 
were produced by distinct sources, so we might expect spatial location to play a role in 
both simultaneous and sequential grouping.   
Spatial properties have an influence on grouping, but even when frequency 
components can be spatially distinguished they are not necessarily grouped according 
to their spatial properties.  Frequency components from the same location are not 
grouped if other non-spatial cues – such as shared onset times and harmonic 
relationships – conflict with spatial cues, and frequency components from different 
locations may be grouped if non-spatial cues indicate that they have the same source.  
Our experience of music played over stereo loudspeakers is a good example of this.  
Frequency components produced by spatially distinct sources – the loudspeakers – 
may be grouped to produce an experience of a single sound, perhaps with an apparent 
source that is located at a place in between or behind the speakers.  This happens 
because the spatial cues to grouping are weaker than the non-spatial cues: the pattern 
of frequency components produced by the two speakers is more likely11 to have been 
produced by a single sound source whose spatial cues have been disrupted than to 
have been produced by two sources.  Diana Deutsch’s ‘scale illusion’ is an example in 
which a sequence of sounds is heard as grouped into a sequence despite the fact that 
individual sounds come from different locations.12 
What both these examples demonstrate is that spatial properties are only a 
weak cue to frequency component grouping, a cue which can be overridden by non-
spatial cues.  This makes ecological sense given that the auditory system functions to 
group frequency components that correspond to their sources.  The transmission of 
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sound waves – with frequency components being detected only after they have been 
reflected off and refracted around surfaces – disrupts spatial cues and makes them 
unreliable.  Their unreliability means that other non-spatial cues are a better guide to 
correct grouping and correct grouping according to spatial cues will only reliably 
correspond to sound sources if those spatial cues are supported by other non-spatial 
cues.   
Although spatial properties can have an influence on auditory grouping they 
are not necessary for grouping.  Frequency components can be appropriately grouped 
even when they cannot be spatially distinguished.  This is evident from the fact that 
we can hear sounds produced by different sources as distinct when their frequency 
components all come from the same location: components are grouped as distinct 
despite being spatially indistinguishable.  This happens, for example, when sounds are 
played over a single loudspeaker, such as a radio, or when different sound sources are 
all heard from behind a barrier or wall.  Frequency components from sources which 
are behind one another relative to the listener will tend to have the same spatial cues 
and so be spatially indistinguishable, yet may be heard as distinct. 
The fact that spatial cues are not necessary for grouping should lead us to 
question in what sense grouping is ever genuinely spatial at all.  Frequency 
components are not themselves intrinsically spatial, nor is the way in which they are 
detected.13 
Spatial information about the location of the source of a frequency component 
must be recovered from time, intensity, and phase differences between each ear’s 
detection of that frequency component.  These relations between the frequency 
components detected by each ear carry information about spatial location, but they 
don’t have any intrinsic spatial significance: there is no intrinsic connection between 
the phase and temporal relationships of frequency components and spatial properties.  
Frequency components only gain spatial significance by being interpreted or encoded 
in a spatial way.   
But such a spatial interpretation or encoding isn’t necessary for the properties 
that encode spatial location to play a role in frequency component grouping.  
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 Neurons of the basilar membrane, which detect properties of the soundwave, are organised in a 
tonotopic way, unlike the neurons of the retina which are spatially organised (with the consequence that 
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Common inter-aural time and phase differences can be used as an indication of 
correct grouping independently of frequency components or groups of frequency 
components having been encoded within a spatial framework.  That means that 
components don’t need to be assigned spatial properties or coordinates and then 
grouped on the basis of shared or different spatial properties or coordinates, they can 
simply be grouped on the basis of temporal and phase relationships.  If components 
are grouped on the basis of temporal and phase relationships then they will be 
grouped according to whether they come from the same or a different location, but 
the process of grouping will not be a spatial process – it will not operate on or use 
spatial properties to determine grouping.  We can therefore explain the role that the 
spatial location of the source of a sound has in grouping frequency components – we 
can explain how frequency component groupings track sameness and difference in 
spatial location – without supposing that the processes or grouping are themselves 
spatial, that they operate on or use spatial properties. 
The fact that spatial cues are not necessary for grouping suggests that 
frequency component groupings are not spatially individuated: distinct groups of 
frequency components are not distinct in virtue of having different spatial properties.  
Given that the auditory system’s grouping of frequency components determines what 
sounds we experience, the fact that groupings are not spatially individuated suggests 
that sounds aren’t either.  It would follow that it is possible to experience two sounds 
as distinct without experiencing them to be spatially distinct.  If my argument is right 
that grouping is not spatial even when it exploits properties that track spatial 
differences, then frequency component groupings do not have spatial properties.   
Again, given that the auditory system’s grouping of frequency components determines 
what sounds we experience, the fact that groupings don’t have spatial properties 
suggests that sounds don’t either.  It suggests, in other words, that sounds don’t have 
any intrinsic spatial significance and don’t have any spatial structure.14 
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Reflecting on our experience of sounds supports these suggestions about 
sounds.  We often hear two sounds as distinct without them having or seeming to have 
different spatial properties; we do so when we listen to music on a radio that has a 
single speaker, or hear sounds coming through the window of the room we are in.  In 
such cases we hear simultaneous sounds as distinct, and can focus our attention on one 
to the exclusion of the other, without being able to distinguish them spatially; if our 
attention is focussed on a place it is always the same place, therefore when we focus 
our attention on one sound rather than another we do not focus our attention on one 
place rather than another.  We don’t hear sounds as having spatial parts or as having 
a spatial structure: although we can make sense of a sound having temporal parts – in 
virtue of the fact that we hear sounds as temporally extended – we cannot make sense 
of spatial parts of sounds: hearing simultaneous sounds as having distinct spatial 
properties is sufficient to hear them as distinct sounds, so we cannot simultaneously 
hear distinct parts of a single sound as standing in spatial relations to one another.   If 
we don’t hear sounds as having spatial parts then it cannot be that what makes 
simultaneous parts of a sound seem to be parts of single sound is that they are spatially 
related, a conclusion that is supported by the fact that it is possible to hear sounds 
without hearing them as having any spatial properties.  The same is surely true of the 
temporal parts of sounds and sequences of sounds.  When we hear a melody we hear a 
sequence of sounds as a sequence.  As the example of listening to music on the radio 
shows, hearing the elements of this sequence as such is not a matter of hearing them as 
sharing spatial properties. 
The claim that sounds are not individuated spatially has empirical support.  A 
soft sound tends to disappear – is masked – if a louder sound of a similar frequency is 
heard simultaneously; however, if the louder sound is spatially separated from the 
softer sound the masking effect is reduced and it is possible to hear the softer sound.  
Thiran and Clarke describe a subject, NM, with a spatial hearing deficit.15  NM can 
hear sounds and recognise their sources, but cannot localise them or perceive them as 
                                                                                                                                       
together is that binding processes exploit spatial properties, binding together as features of a single 
object those features which share spatial properties.  Spatial properties are necessary for visual binding, 
and hence necessary for object identity.  The spatial properties that individuate visual objects in early 
vision are properties of the visual field, and are independent of any mapping of visual objects into an 
egocentric frame of reference.   
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moving; sounds presented at different azimuthal positions seem to her all to be at the 
same position.  Despite this spatial deficit, NM experiences the release from masking 
effect: she cannot hear a soft sound when the masking sound was in the same position 
as the soft sound, but can hear it when they are spatially separated.  When asked to 
report the location of the masking sound she said that she always heard it in the same 
place, superimposed on the softer sound.  For this subject spatial properties play a role 
in grouping sounds and so in determining what sounds she experiences, but in a way 
that doesn’t enter in to the content of her experience: she hears sounds as distinct 
without experiencing them as spatially distinct and she doesn’t experience sounds as 
having spatial properties. 16 
Although the processes that determine what sounds we hear are not 
intrinsically spatial, our auditory experience is, or can be, spatial: we can hear where 
the sources of sounds are.  For us to be able to hear the locations of the sources of 
sounds the auditory system must extract spatial information about the locations of the 
sources from the groups of frequency components that it detects and from the 
differences between the groups detected by each ear.  If what I have already argued is 
correct, the auditory system doesn’t interpret individual frequency components as 
having a spatial significance; it first groups frequency components from a single 
source, and then extracts from the group spatial information about the source.  The 
process that extracts spatial information occurs as part of the third stage of auditory 
processing – the stage that functions to extract information about sound sources.  This 
process is distinct from the second stage of grouping processes that I have described.  
Spatial location is one of a range of properties of the source of the sound, information 
about which the auditory system extracts from frequency components that have been 
grouped to correspond to their source.17 
What kind of spatial information does the auditory system extract?  It can only 
extract what spatial information is available.  Spatial information about sound sources 
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 Although she describes or indicates the sounds as originating at the same place, it’s plausible that they 
don’t seem to her to be located or come from anywhere and that she makes her indication only because 
of the requirements of experiment (in conversation, Clarke has agreed that this is a plausible 
interpretation of NM). 
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 This suggests an interpretation of the “‘what’ and ‘where’” distinction in auditory perception which is 
at odds with the dominant view in psychology; for an elaboration and defence see my ‘What and 
Where in Auditory Perception’. 
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is (for the most part)18 embodied in the differences in phase, time, and intensity of 
groups of frequency components detected by each ear.  This information concerns the 
location of the source of the sound relative to the perceiver’s head.  The initial 
interpretation of the location of a sound source will therefore be in a head or body 
centred frame of reference – one that represents the location of the source of a sound 
relative to the perceiver’s head or body.  As a consequence of the fact that we perceive 
the locations of sources relative to where we are is that we can, immediately and 
without calculation, turn our heads or point in the direction of the source of a sound 
we hear.  We also perceive the locations of sound sources relative to one another – we 
can hear, for example, that one source is to the left of another.  Our perceptual system 
must therefore map the head or body-centred locations of sound sources into other 
non-egocentric frames of reference (perhaps frames of reference shared with other 
senses).19  However, given the way that spatial information is embodied in soundwaves 
it is possible to map the location of a sound source in a non-egocentric frame of 
reference only if it has first been located egocentrically.  It would seem to be necessary, 
therefore, that if we experience the source of a sound as having a location we 
experience it as having a location relative to where we are. 
 
3. The Spatial Phenomenology of Auditory Experience 
 
The objection to the view of sounds that I outlined at the end of section 1 is that 
sounds seem to be located where their sources are.  This is a phenomenological claim, 
a claim which is supported by appeal to how things experientially seem.  To answer 
this objection I will first describe the way in which sound sources seem to be located 
and then ask in what sense, if any, sounds seem to be located at their sources. 
In his well known discussion of sight and touch Mike Martin draws a contrast 
between the different ways we experience space and objects as located in space.  He 
points out that in vision we are aware of a region of space within which we can 
experience objects – that we experience space itself and objects in space – whereas in 
touch we experience the location of parts of objects that we are aware of as extended 
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 Reflections play a role too but not in a way that undermines this line of argument (see Bluert 1997, 
sec 2). 
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 See Spence and Driver, 2004, especially chapters 10 and 11. 
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in a space that extends beyond the limits of our experience, but which is itself 
experienced.  He illustrates the contrast with an example: 
 
Consider the case of looking at a ring-shaped object, a Polo mint, for 
instance, head on.  One is aware of the various white parts of the mint 
arranged in a circle, and aware of how they are related to each other.  One is 
also aware of the hole in the middle of the mint, and that that hole is there in 
the middle.  If one was not aware of the hole one would not see the mint as 
ring shaped rather than a circle.  Nothing need be perceived to be within the 
hole.  One is aware of the hole as a place where something potentially could 
be seen, not as where something is actually seen to be… So we can think of 
normal visual experience as experience not only of objects which are located 
in some space, but as of a space within which they are located.  The space is 
part of the experience in as much as one is aware of the region as a potential 
location for objects of vision (Martin, 1992, p.199). 
 
This description of an experience as of space doesn’t seem an appropriate description 
of our tactile experience: 
 
when one grasps the rim [of a glass] one comes into contact with it at only 
five points, where one’s fingertips touch it.  Nevertheless one comes to be 
aware that the glass as a whole is circular.  In being tactually aware in this 
way, is one aware of the parts of the rim in between the points of contact in 
the same way as one is aware of those points, and is one aware of the region 
of space lying inside the rim?  The answer would appear to be not: one comes 
to be aware of the glass by being aware of the parts one touches.  In this it 
contrasts with the Polo mint, since one is aware both of the ring-surface and 
the hole in the same way (ibid, p.200).  
 
The description of visual experience as an experience of space doesn’t seem 
appropriate as a description of our auditory experience either.  Suppose that you hear 
two sound sources as located one in front and to the left and one in front and to the 
right of you: you are aware of the locations of the sources and aware that they are a 
certain distance apart separated by a region of space.  Your awareness of these places 
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is similar to the tactile awareness you might have of the rim of a glass.  Just as in the 
tactile case, where we are aware of the rim at the points we touch it and there is a 
contrast between our awareness of the locations of the points of contact and our 
awareness of the space between those points, in the auditory case you are aware of 
places in virtue of hearing something to be located there and there is a contrast 
between the way in which you are aware of the places where you hear something to 
be and your awareness of the region of space that separates those places.  In both 
touch and hearing the space that separates the experienced locations is not itself an 
object of the experience.  In neither case are we aware of the region of space between 
the places we experience something to be in the way that we are visually aware of the 
empty space that is the hole in the Polo mint.  In this respect, then, the 
phenomenology of our auditory experience of space is more similar to the 
phenomenology of our tactile than to our visual experience of space. 
But this poses a puzzle.  In order to mark the phenomenological differences 
between our visual, tactile, and auditory experiences of things in space we seem 
compelled to say that although in vision we are aware of space, this is not true of 
touch or hearing: in touch and hearing we are aware of things in space, but we are not 
aware of space itself.  However, there’s a sense in which our auditory and tactile 
experiences do provide us with an awareness of space.  Although we only touch the 
rim of a glass at five points we are aware of the rim as circular and so as occupying the 
space in between the points we touch; although we hear the location of two objects 
relative to one another we are aware of them as separated in space and so aware of 
the space in between where we hear them to be.  One the one hand, in order to mark 
the phenomenological differences, we need to deny that we are auditory and tactually 
aware of space; on the other hand, we can only explain how we are auditorily and 
tactilely aware of things in space by supposing that we have both an auditory and a 
tactile awareness of space.  So we both do and do not have a tactile and auditory 
awareness of space. 
The problem is to explain the phenomenological contrast, in tactile and 
auditory experience, between our awareness of the places we experience something to 
be and our awareness of the places where we don’t experience anything to be (those 
places, for example, in between the places we experience things to be), and so to give 
some account of how we are aware of places we don’t experience anything to be. 
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Prima facie this doesn’t seem possible within the framework of a 
representational theory of perception.20  A representational theory of perception 
explains what it is to experience something in terms of the representational content of 
an experience.   We have an experience of something in virtue of our experience 
representing it as being some way.  To say that we are experientially aware of 
something is then just to say that we are aware of it in virtue of having an experience 
of it.  But that means we cannot draw a distinction between experiencing something 
and being experientially aware of it.  We can either say that we are aware of space in 
virtue of our experience representing that space, or that we have an experience of 
space in virtue of our experience representing it.  Both amount to the same thing.  
How then do we draw the contrast we need to explain the differences between visual, 
tactile, and auditory experience of space? 
The suggestion that I want to explore is that we can explain the contrast in 
terms of the determinacy with which spatial properties are represented by different 
experiences. What does it mean to say that something is represented more or less 
determinately?  I have in mind the intuitive idea that an experience can tell us more 
or less about some region of our environment by representing that region and the 
objects and properties within it in greater or less detail, in a more or less determinate 
way. 
We are familiar with the idea that pictures can represent more or less 
determinately.  A colour photograph of an apple tells us more about the apple than a 
black and white photograph does; the black and white photograph doesn’t tell us what 
colour the apple is, whether it is red for example.  A black and white photograph 
neither represents that the apple is red nor that the apple is not red.  We shouldn’t 
think of a black and white photograph as misrepresenting the colour of the apple – as 
representing it to have a colour it doesn’t have – it is simply silent on the question of 
the apple’s colour and so doesn’t represent the apple as having a determinate colour.  
Similarly, an outline drawing of a bird is in many respects indeterminate.  It doesn’t 
represent the colour of the bird, nor whether the bird has feathers, nor whether the 
surface of its back is different to that of its legs.  Again, it is not that the drawing is 
misleading; it is just not very informative.  It doesn’t tell us much about the bird, 
whether it has or lacks certain properties; it is, in certain respects, indeterminate. 
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This idea of a representation representing in more or less determinate ways 
can be applied to perceptual experience.  A perceptual experience represents the 
perceiver’s environment as being some way in virtue of having representational 
content.  We can specify the representational content of a perceptual experience by 
specifying those ways which the perceiver’s environment can be that are consistent 
with the representational content of the experience being correct.  Thought of this 
way, the representational content of an experience specifies a set of ways the 
perceiver’s environment can be and the experience is veridical only if the perceiver’s 
environment is one of those ways.  The same approach can be used to specify the way 
in which an experience represents an object: we specify which ways the object can be 
that are consistent with the representational content of the experience being correct.  
A perceptual experience whose content is relatively determinate will specify a 
narrower set of ways that things could be; by telling us more about how things are it 
narrows down the possible ways things could be.  An experience whose content is 
relatively indeterminate will specify a wider set of ways that things could be; by telling 
us less about how things are, it allows a greater number of possible ways things could 
be.  We can use this notion of the indeterminacy of experience to explain the 
differences between visual and tactile experiences of space. 
For example, a visual experience that represents the rim of a glass as circular is 
more determinate than a tactile experience that represents the rim of a glass as 
circular; the visual experience narrows down the ways a certain region of space could 
be far more than the tactile experience.  It does so because it tells us more about the 
rim, the glass, and the space around the glass: it represents the rim of the glass as 
circular and for a region of space – the region that is visible from the subject’s point of 
view – it represents, for every location within that region, either something as at that 
location or that location as empty.  The experience is veridical only if the visible 
region of space is occupied at those locations where something is represented to be, 
and empty at those locations where nothing is represented to be.  It is because it 
represents every location within a region of space as determinately occupied or empty 
that visual experience is an experience of space as well as objects in space.  A tactile 
experience of the rim of the glass represents the rim of the glass as circular, and so 
represents the rim as occupying a region of space that extends between the points of 
contact with the glass, but is silent about the larger space within which the rim of the 
glass is experienced to be: it doesn’t represent any location within that larger space as 
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either occupied or as empty.  That means that there are many ways that larger space 
could be that are consistent with the experience being veridical.  There could, for 
example, be a circular piece of opaque card stuck just inside the rim of the glass.  The 
tactile experience doesn’t rule out such a possibility, whereas the visual experience 
does.  By representing the rim of the glass as occupying a larger region of space, the 
tactile experience represents spatial locations that are not locations of parts of the rim; 
however, unlike visual experience, it doesn’t tell us anything about those locations – it 
doesn’t represent them as occupied or as not occupied – and so doesn’t provide us 
with an experience of the space.   As a consequence of these differences, there are far 
fewer ways that the region of space could be that are consistent with the visual 
experience being veridical than are consistent with the tactile experience being 
veridical.  Similarly, the visual experience of the rim of the glass represents each part 
of the rim in an equally determinate way.  In contrast, the tactile experience of the rim 
of the glass represents the parts of the rim at the points of contact more determinately 
than the parts in between the points of contact.  We are aware of the texture of the 
rim at the points of contact, for example, but not at the points in between.  Therefore 
the experience tells us less about the parts of the rim in between the points of contact 
than it does about those points; this difference explains the contrast between our 
awareness of the rim at the points of contact and our awareness of the points in 
between.  Although both visual and tactile experiences tell us that the rim is circular, 
because it tells us more about the rim of the glass and the surrounding space there are 
fewer ways the rim could be that are consistent with the visual experience than with 
the tactile experience being correct.21 
This explains the different ways in which we are aware of space in touch.  A 
tactile experience tells us about the places we experience something to be – that they 
are occupied – and it tells us that there are places in between the places we experience 
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 Amodal completion provides the closest visual analogue of our tactile experience of shape.  The 
fragmentary outline of an occluded circle may still be seen as circular – the fragments are experienced 
as parts of a circle – but there is a contrast between our visual awareness of the visible fragments and 
our awareness of the parts of the circle that are occluded. When we see the letter B obscured behind a 
squiggle (see diagram) we experience only parts of the letter, but are aware of the surface as forming the 
letter B.  Our experience represents the letter as shaped like a B and so represents the surface as 
extending underneath the squiggle.  But we don’t experience the surface underneath the squiggle we just 
experience those parts of the letter that are not obscured. 
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something to be; but it tells us nothing about those in-between places.  It doesn’t tell 
us, for example, whether or not they are occupied.  There is, therefore, a contrast 
between our awareness of the places we experience something to be and our 
awareness of the places in between. 
We can explain the phenomenological differences between vision and touch, 
in particular the differences in our experience of space, by appealing to the 
determinacy of the content of visual and tactile experiences.  We can explain the 
phenomenology of our auditory experience of space in a similar way.   
Our auditory experiences represent space in a way that is often far less 
determinate than either visual or tactile experience.  This is most obviously true of an 
experience of a sound source that doesn’t seem to be located anywhere.  Such an 
experience is indeterminate with respect to the location of the source: it doesn’t tell us 
anything about where the source is located and its veridicality is independent of the 
actual location of the source.  When we do experience the source of a sound as 
located, our experience may tell us more or less about where the source is.  We may 
experience a source as being outside of the room, as being somewhere over on the 
right, or as being over on the right and just in front of us.  In each case the experience 
veridically represents the location of the source just in case it is somewhere outside the 
room, or somewhere to our right, or somewhere to our right and in front.  The 
experiences differ in the determinacy with which they represent the location of the 
source; greater determinacy corresponds to smaller regions of space within which the 
source must be located if the experience is to be veridical.  Our auditory spatial acuity 
is relatively poor so even in the best circumstances the most determinate auditory 
experience is quite indeterminate about spatial location. 
Auditory experience doesn’t tell us anything about regions of space other than 
those where we experience sound sources to be.  If we experience the source of a 
sound to be over on our right and another source to be over on the left then we are 
aware of their being separated by a region of space, and our experience represents the 
spatial relation between them; but it doesn’t tell us anything about that space, in 
particular it doesn’t tell us whether there is anything at the places in between the 
places we hear the sources to be.  It doesn’t represent those locations as either 
occupied or as empty. 
Whilst it is true that we experience the location of the sources of sounds and 
that sound sources seem – phenomenologically – to be located, simply saying that 
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sound sources seem to be located obscures the differences between the way auditory 
and visual experience represents the spatial location of objects.  Sound sources seem to 
be located in a different way to the way objects that we see seem to be located.  In 
particular, sound sources seem to be located only in virtue of seeming to be 
somewhere relative to where we are and to other sound sources: our auditory 
experience represents sound sources as located in space in virtue of representing them 
as standing in spatial relations to one another and to us.   
Unlike visual experience, auditory experience doesn’t represent empty places – 
it doesn’t represent places as unoccupied.  That means that auditory experience only 
represents spatial relations between the locations where we experience the sources of 
sounds to be, and between those places and us.  Visual experience represents both the 
locations of objects and of places as unoccupied, and it represents spatial relations 
both between the locations of objects it and between those objects and places it 
represents as unoccupied.  Auditory experience doesn’t represent places as 
unoccupied and doesn’t, therefore, represent the spatial relations between the 
locations of sound sources and of unoccupied places.  Visual experience represents 
objects and parts of objects, and the spatial relations between objects and their parts.  
Auditory experience doesn’t represent sound sources as having parts and so doesn’t 
represent parts of objects as spatially related to one another.  Unlike our visual 
experience, our auditory experience of space is exhausted by our awareness of spatial 
relations between sound sources and us, and between sound sources and other sound 
sources.  Our visual awareness of space is not exhausted by our awareness of objects as 
spatially located relative to each other and to us.  Visual experience represents the 
spatial properties of objects and it represents objects as having parts that are spatially 
related to one another; visual experience represents places, whether occupied or not, 
and so represents spatial relations between places and objects; we are aware of the 
spatial relations of objects to space itself – to places where we experience nothing to 
be.   
There are, then, significant differences between our visual experience of the 
location of objects and our auditory experience of the location of objects, and so 
between the sense in which objects we see seem to be located and the sense in which 
the objects we hear seem to be located, and it doesn’t follow form the fact that sound 
sources seem to be located that they seem to be located in the same way that visual 
objects seem to be located. 
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We experience the sources of sounds as located; do we experience sounds as 
located?  Sounds do not seem to be located anywhere other than their sources; 
therefore, if sounds seem to be located they must seem to be located where their 
sources are.  To answer the question, then, of whether sounds seem to be located we 
need to answer the question of whether we experience sounds as located where we 
experience their sources to be.  When we hear the alarm clock ringing we can hear 
where the clock is – that it is on our left-hand side – do we also hear where the sound 
of the alarm clock is – does the sound of the alarm seem to be where the alarm clock 
seems to be? 
One model for how sounds might seem to be located is a visual one.  We can 
see a pattern or mark as located where an object is located by seeing the pattern as a 
pattern on the surface of the object. Suppose, for example, that we see a cube with a 
cross marked on one of its faces.  We can see where the cube is – we experience the 
cube as having a location – and we experience the cross as located where we 
experience the cube as located.  The cross seems to be where the cube is because it 
seems to be on the surface of the cube, and the cross seems to be on the surface of the 
cube – at least in part – because it has spatial parts that we experience as spatially 
related to parts of the surface of the cube.  This explanation of the cross seeming to be 
where the cube is depends on both the pattern and the cube having spatial parts and 
our experiencing parts of the pattern as spatially related to parts of the cube.   
In this example the pattern and the object can both be identified 
independently of one another and each has a spatial location: in seeming to see the 
pattern as on the surface of the cube we seem to see it as having the same location as 
that of the surface.  Its having the same location as the cube is a contingent matter.  
We could see the pattern as being located elsewhere, and in seeming to see the pattern 
as on the surface of the cube our experience may mislead us.  The pattern could be 
located elsewhere and merely appear, as the result perhaps of an arrangement of 
mirrors, to be located on the surface of the cube. 
This model, of two independently identifiable objects which can differ in 
location but which are experienced as having the same location – as sharing spatial 
properties – is the only one according to which it could follow from the spatial 
phenomenology of experience that one object has the same location as another object.  
Each object seems to have a location and both seem to have the same location.  It’s 
not a model that applies to our auditory experience of sounds and their sources.  We 
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don’t experience sounds as having a spatial location independently of their sources 
having a spatial location, nor do we experience sounds as having spatial parts, so we 
don’t experience sounds as having the same spatial location as their sources, nor as 
having parts that stand in spatial relations to parts of their sources.  If sounds seem to 
be located at their sources it is not because they seem to have the same location as their 
sources. 
Can sounds seem to be where their sources are other than in virtue of seeming 
to share spatial properties with their sources?  Perhaps, by analogy with colour, they 
can.  The surfaces of objects appear coloured: when we see the surface of an object as 
coloured the colour seems to be where the surface is.  The colour doesn’t seem to be 
where the surface is in virtue of seeming to share spatial properties with the surface; it 
does so because it seems to be a property or quality of the surface.  Because of the way 
they seem, any account of what colours are that claims that colours are not properties 
of surfaces must view the phenomenology of our experience of colours as misleading 
and so is committed to an error theory of colour experience.22   
The phenomenological objection to my account of sounds may best be 
understood in a similar way: sounds seem to be properties or qualities of the objects 
that are their sources and so seem to be located where those objects are located – not 
in virtue of sharing spatial properties with those objects, but in virtue of seeming to be 
properties or qualities of them.  It would follow that any view of sounds that claims 
that sounds are not properties of objects and not located where those objects are 
located must view the phenomenology of our experiences of sounds as misleading and 
so is – unacceptably – committed to an error theory of auditory experience.  If that’s 
right then it’s not that my account of auditory experience gets the spatial content of 
that experience wrong; it fails to accommodate the fact that sounds seem to be 
qualities of objects. 
Is an objection along these lines right – do the sounds we experience seem to 
be properties of their sources in the same way that colours seem to be properties of the 
surfaces of objects?  To answer that question we need first to determine what it is 
about our experience of colours that makes it correct to describe them as seeming or 
appearing to be properties of the surfaces of objects.  Although it is widely agreed that 
colours do seem that way, what it is about how they seem that makes that description 
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appropriate is not often discussed.  There are, nonetheless, features of the appearance 
of colours that make that description appropriate. 
The way the colour of a surface appears is determined by both the colour of 
the surface and the way that the surface is illuminated.  The way a surface appears – 
in particular the way the colour of a surface appears – changes according to how the 
surface is illuminated.  For example, a surface of uniform colour that has a shadow 
cast on it has a different appearance to a surface without a shadow cast on it.  Such 
differences in the way the colour of a surface appears do not normally appear to be 
differences in the colour of the surface; they appear to be what they are: differences in 
the way the surface is illuminated.23  Normally, we can distinguish in our experience 
between differences in how the colour of a surface appears which are due to variations 
in the colour of the surface and differences in how the colour of a surface appears 
which are due to variations in how the surface is illuminated.   
Our ability to make this distinction in our visual experience depends on the 
fact that the colour of a surface can appear to be constant through changes in 
illumination.  To see a shadow on a surface as a shadow is to see it as a discontinuity 
in the illumination of a uniformly coloured surface rather than as discontinuity in the 
colour of a uniformly illuminated surface.  (Conversely, to see a discontinuity as a 
discontinuity in the colour of the surface is to see a change in the way the surface 
appears as independent of its illumination.)  We cannot explain the appearance of the 
colour of the surface other than in terms of the way two things appear to interact: the 
colour of the surface appears to interact with the light illuminating it. 
It is because we can distinguish between those changes in the way the colour of 
the surface appears that are due to variations in the apparent colour of the surface 
from those that are due to apparent variations in the way the colour is illuminated that 
it is correct to describe colours as seeming to be surface properties of objects – as 
properties of surfaces that stay constant through changes in illumination and which 
partly determine how the surface appears.  If we could not make this distinction then 
colours would not seem to be properties of the surfaces of objects.  Sometimes (when, 
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 That they appear this way is not the result of our judging that a variation is a variation in illumination 
rather than a variation in the surface; it’s a matter of how they experientially appear.  That variations in 
illumination appear differently to variations in surface colour is a consequence of the operation of 
colour and lightness constancy mechanisms in visual processing.  See Gilchrist (2006) for a state of the 
art discussion of the mechanisms of lightness constancy. 
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for example, a surface is viewed through a reduction screen that prevents the 
perception of its illumination) it is not possible to tell whether a change in the 
appearance of a colour is a variation in the surface or a variation in the illumination of 
the surface.  In such cases the colour does not seem to be the colour of the surface, but 
has the appearance of what Katz called ‘film’ colour – colour that appears transparent 
and is looked through rather than at.24 
Are there similar features of the appearance of sounds that would make the 
description of sounds as apparent properties of objects appropriate?  The appearance 
of the sounds we hear is determined both by the character of the vibration of the 
object that produced the sound and by the way that vibration is altered during its 
transmission from its source to our ears.  To justify the description of sounds as 
seeming to be properties of the objects that produce them there should be a similar 
pattern within our experience of sounds as there is within our experience of colours: 
the way sounds appear should be explained as the result of the apparent interaction of 
the sound-of-the-object and the transmission of the sound.  That is, the way sounds 
appear should appear to be the result of the interaction of the-sound-of-the-object and 
the way the-sound-of-the-object interacts with its environment.  Then sounds would 
appear to be properties of their sources similarly to the way that colours seem to be 
properties of surfaces.  
The appearance of a sound does not appear to be the joint upshot of the 
apparent sound-of-an-object together with the apparent alteration of the sound during 
transmission.  That is, we cannot distinguish in experience between aspects of how 
sounds appear which are due to the sound-of-the-object, and aspects of how sounds 
appear which are due to alterations of the sound during transmission.  The 
appearance of a sound is simply determined by how the sound we hear appears to be.  
(Contrast this with colour: the appearance of a colour – for non-film colours – is not 
simply determined by how the colour appears to be, but by how the colour appears to 
be together with how the colour appears to be illuminated). 
We can, of course, distinguish in auditory experience between how a sound 
appears to be and how the source of that sound appears to be.  How a sound appears 
can change without the source of that sound appearing to change.  A sound may 
                                                
24
 Katz wrote that “a complete impression of illumination is had only where objects are perceived, and 
… whenever objects are perceived an impression of illumination is always produced” (Katz 1935, p.10). 
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appear to be quieter, for example, without the event that produced it appearing to 
change. When we close the window to shut out the sounds of the traffic the sounds we 
hear get quieter, but what is making the sounds doesn’t appear to change; when you 
pull your hat down over your ears the sounds you hear become muffled, but the things 
producing those sounds appear unaltered.  What appear not to change are the objects 
that produce the sounds, not the sounds that they produce; the sounds they produce do 
appear to change – they appear to be quieter or muffled.  It’s not that the sound-in-
the-object appears to be unchanged through changes in how the sound appears; it’s 
that the object appears to be unchanged through changes in how the sound appears to 
be.  The sound-in-the-object doesn’t appear to be any way at all. 
There are no grounds, therefore, for our saying that the sound-in-the-object 
appears responsible for how the sound appears in the way that the surface colour of an 
object appears responsible for how the colour of the surface appears; and no grounds, 
therefore, for saying that sounds seem to be properties of objects rather than things 
produced by objects.  In fact, the opposite is true.  That sounds can appear to 
change,25 and can be changed, without their objects appearing to change is what leads 
us to describe sounds as seeming to come from their sources, and makes such a 
description appropriate. 
Sounds don’t seem to be at their sources in virtue of sharing spatial properties, 
nor in virtue of seeming to be qualities of their sources.  Therefore, the 
phenomenology of auditory experience is not inconsistent with an account of sounds, 
such as mine, according to which sounds are not located at their sources.  In fact, the 
opposite is true: the account I have given is not only consistent with that 




                                                
25
 Note that although sounds appear to change independently of objects, the same is not true of colours.  
The appearance of the colour of a surface can change independently of the surface of the object 
appearing to change, but such a change is not a change in the apparent colour of the surface; it is a 
change in the apparent illumination of the surface.  If the apparent illumination is held fixed then the 
appearance of the colour of the surface can only change if the colour of the surface – and so the object 
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